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1. ABSTRACT
This thesis examines a method for optimizing the effectiveness
bf existing sealift fleets given a limited budget. A brief
background of U.S. military mobility is presented. Relevant cost
categories of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) and prepositioned
forces are determined by looking at the life-cycle of sealift
ships. A methodology for determining an optimal fleet mix is
presented. Two models for optimizing the direct costs of mobilizing
the RRF and prepositioned forces are developed. The first model
is based upon a single trip to the war zone. The second model
develops the possibility that sealift ships may make multiple trips
to the war zone and return to U.S. seaports. Methodologies for
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The United States provides war materials to a war zone using
three methods: (i) military airlift, (ii) the use of prepositioned
stocks, and liii) military sealift ships. The three methods are
commonly referred as the mobility triad. The two ways in which
sealift transports materials to a war zone are via Ready Reserve
ships and by prepositioning ships. Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships
are stationed at various locations within the continental United
States while Maritime Prepositioned Ships (MPS) are located in the
vicinity of the most likely war zones.
To date, the 104 ships within the Ready Reserve Force have been
purchased by the U.S. and stored for possible use in transporting
war materials. Upon notification of an impending conflict, RRF
ships are brought out of storage and made operational. War stocks
are then loaded on to the ships and the ships are then sailed to
the theater of conflict.
The United States uses 13 Maritime Prepositioned Ships located
near strategic areas of operations to provide a timely surge of war
fighting equipment. These ships are fully stocked to provide war
fighting material and 30 days of supplies for a Marine Amphibious
Battalion (about 16,500 men).
B. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to develop models and
procedures in order to make better use of the Ready Reserve Force
1
and prepositioned forces under budgetary constraints. More
specifically, given a crises, what is the priority of ship
activation for the expected sealift operation. Two models are
developed. The first model develops an optimization framework for
choosing a fleet of sealift ships that perform a single trip to the
war zone during a crisis. The second model takes into consideration
the possibility that the sealift ships may have to make numerous
trips during a crisis. The models are developed so that policy
makers can examine trade-offs regarding speed, capacity, and
budgets.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question is whether a model can be
developed that can guide the use of sealift forces in time of
crisis. Secondary questions include: what are the relevant costs of
the RRF?, what are the relevant costs of the prepositioned forces?,
and how can the best mix of ships be determined given the trade-off
of speed and capacity and the preferences of policy makers?.
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
1. Scope
The scope of the paper is restricted to the development of
models for Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships and Maritime
Prepositioning Ships (MPS). Airlift was not addressed because it
performs a different mission. Airlift delivers a variety of surge
equipment, emergency equipment, and the personnel to fight a war.
Sealift provides the vast majority of equipment that will be used
2
in a conflict including surge requirements, but mainly sustaining
equipment.
2. Limitations
One of the limitations of the model results from the
accounting practices of the Maritime Administration (MARAD) and the
Strategic Sealift Command (MSC). Costs are tracked by budget
category (i.e. Operations and Maintenance, Shipbuilding and
Conversion etc.) and not by ship categories and age. The level of
detail of cost data was broader than what is required by the model.
,-However, development of the model suggests that significant
benefits could be associated with the collection of data by ship
category and age.
Another limitation was that no studies were discovered with a
similar scope in an extensive review of the literature. The
available literature tended to focus either on a review of military
sealift capabilities and programs or on specific linear programming
and transportation problems.
3. Assumptions
A primary assumption is that the size of military sealift
fleets will not decrease, but may increase in the future. Another
assumption is that indirect costs will not significantly effect the
results of the analysis (although future studies might relax this
assumption). It is implicitly assumed that indirect costs will not
vary significantly with marginal changes to current ,ealift
capabilities. Another assumption is that the marginal rate oý
substitution is a linear function that does not change with changes
3
in the levels of attributes (Chapter 5, Section E). Finally, the
endurance of sealift ships was assumed not to be a factor in the
decision of policy makers when selecting between ships of high
speed and low capacity or low speed and high capacity. It is
assumed that the endurance of both types of ships is adequate.
Z. LITERATMRE REVZEW
The literature that was surveyed and examined to produce this
paper includes the hiatory and background of military mobility by
various military and civilian authors, the Navy's Strategic Sealift
Division (OP-42), various masters theses, and military and trade
magazines. Cost information was derived from studies done by the
Center for Naval Analysis (CNA), the Naval Audit Service, and
documents received from the Maritime Administration, the Department
of Defense, and Rana Corporation. The economic analysis came from
economics text books, and papers in various economics journals.
F. ORGANIZATION
The study begins with background information about military
mobility. The concept of operations of airlift and sealift are
examined. Next, an optimization model is developed for the Ready
Reserve Force and prepositioned ships. This model is based upon
sealift ships making only one trip to the war zone. A second model
in which sealift ships would make multiple trips to the war zone is
included next. Finally, a conclusion and summary are provided. A
typical sealift scenario is developed and placed in the appendix.
This scenario could be useful as a baseline in the future




The military strategy of the United States emphasizes forward
deployment for deterrence and the forward engagement of potential
aggressors on a global basis. (Ref. 1:pg. 1] This strategy
requires that war materials be prepositioned in forward areas, and
that there exists a capability to transport materials, equipment,
and combat personnel to the theater of war. In the United States
strategic mobility consists of a triad of sealift, airlift and
prepositioning to deploy and sustain U.S. forces overseas. As shown
in Figure 1, each of the mobility elements is interdependent and
each has its advantages and disadvantages.
Sealift is a basic responsibility of the Department of the
Navy. The Navy's sealift capability is designed to transport very
large quantities of heavy equipment, ammunition, fuel, and supplies
for sustained operations overseas. Airlift is the responsibility of
the Department of the Air Force. Airlift capability is designed to
transport combat personnel and small quantities of heavy equipment.
While sealift has greater transport capability, airlift is able to
transport in much less time. At-sea prepositioning is a joint
responsibility of all the services. The concept of at-sea
prepositioning is to hold heavy equipment, ammunition, food stuffs,
water, lubricants, and supplies on-board various cargo ships. The
5
cargo ships are then located or anchored near a possible war
theater until needed. (Ref. l:pg. 1]
ADVANTAGES VIS='VANTA=kS
AIRLIFT: FAST LIMITED CAPACITY
FLEXIBLE (cargo can AIRFIELD DEPENDENT
be changed quickly)
SEALIFT: LARGE CAPACITY SLOW
SOME FLEXIBILITY SEAPORT/SEALANE DEPENDENT
PREPCSITION: FAST REQUIRES MARRY-UP
REDUCES SHIP MOVEMENT LACKS FLEXIBILITY
(less vulnerable)
l'igure 1. The Mobility Triad
B. SO"RCUS OF MILITARY MOBILITY
1. Military Sealift
a. Scope
On 13 March 1984 the Secretary of the Navy, John
Lehman, designated strategic sealift as a distinct Navy function.
(Ref. l:pg. 1) In clarifying this role, the Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral Watkins, defined strategic sealift as "The
afloat prepositioning and ocean movement of material, petroleum,
oil and lubricants, and personnel in support of assigned logistic
support missions of the U.S. government, including the necessary
cargo handling systems and personnel to ensure delivery of cargo
ashore." This scope has been broadened to include the needs of the
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Air Force and Army and to ensure multi-service compatibility. (Ref.
l:pg. 1]
b. Concept of Operat one
Strategic sealift for mobility of forces includes three
major categories of shipping: prepositioned, surge, and resupply.
(Ref. l:pg. 3] The three categories of shipping provide two broad
types of equipment: unit equipment and sustaining supplies.
Prepositioned equipment is to be delivered rapidly to the theater
of operations; usually within days. The concept of prepositioning
is to load military equipment and supplies on board ships and then
preposition the ships near a contingency area. Should a conflict
occur in the region, these ships are sailed to the war theater and
"married" to '-he incoming airlifted personnel. Surge shipping is
relied on to transport most equipment and supplies to the war
theater from the continental United States. Surge equipment arrives
after prepositioned material and continues to be stocked until
there is enough war material to fight as directed. Resupply
equipment immediately follows the surge equipment to sustain combat
operations. [Ref. l:pg. 4]
Figure 2 shows the timing of each major category of
strategic shipping and the type of equipment that each provides.
Surge shipping brings all war-fighting equipment and supplies to
the area of operations that are not delivered by prepositioned
ships. Surge shipping rises and then falls after directed equipment
7
levels reach the war theater. Resupply shipping provides all
equipment and materials that are needed to sustain forces provided
by surge shipping. Resupply shipping rises as force levels rise and






PREPOSITIONED - SURGE RESUPPLY
(AFLOAT) DAYS AFTER DEPLOYMENT DECISION,•--- -- .(Ref. I :p gj., 4)
Figure 2. Timing of Shipping Channels
c. Strategic Sealift Assets
(1) Prepositioned Ships. There are two prepositioned
forces, the Maritime Prepositioned Force and the Afloat
Prepositioning, both of which come under the control of the
8
Military Sealift Command. The Afloat Prepositioning Force is made
of 23 ships of various types including breakbulk ships, container
ships, and tankers. Breakbulk ships are cargo ships with multiple
hatches and holds, fitted with booms or cranes for self-sustaining
load/discharge. Prepositioning ships are loaded with combat
supplies such as ammunition, fuel, water, and lubricants in support
of all U.S. services. [Ref. 2:pg. 10]
The Maritime Prepositioning Force consists of 13
ships operated under long term contracts (25 years) by civilian
shippers. A civilian long term contract was considered necessary to
help maintain a base of merchant seamen in the United States.
These ships carry a varied load of equipment, fuel, food, water,
and other supplies for the U.S. Marine Corps.
The ships are divided into three squadrons anchored
separately in U.S. areas of interest: Middle East/Indian Ocean,
North Atlantic/Europe, and South-East Asia/Korea. [Ref. 3] Each
squadron carries sufficient equipment and supplies to sustain a
U.S.M.C. Expeditionary Brigade of 16,500 men for thirty days of
combat.[Ref. 2:pg. 10] The on-board equipment and supplies are
regularly maintained by U.S. service personnel, while the ships are
maintained by civilian shippers. Every ten years the ships are
rotated to the U.S. for unpacking, inspection, maintenance and
repacking. [Ref. 3]
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(2) Ready Reserve Force. The Ready Reserve Force (RMF)
consists of a variety of types of military capable merchant vessels
and special purpose ships. TVc ships are kept in reserve under the
Maritime Administration (MARAD) which is the government
organization concerned with ocean going activities. MARAD is part
of the Department of Transportation. The ships, which were
commercially less useful, were individually selected on the basis
of significant remaining steaming life. Ready Reserve ships are
maintained so that they can be activated and manned for operations
in 5, 10, or 20 days at designated shipyards without dry docking.
[Ref. 2:pg. 10] The requirement to activate a ship without dry
docking significantly reduces the time needed to make a ship
operational.
(3) Fast Sealift Ships. The United States has a fast
sealift program consisting of eight high speed SL-7 container ships
subsequently converted for rapid load, transport, and off-load of
Army combat equipment. [Ref. 3] The ships are operated by
commercial shipping companies under contract by the Military
Sealift Command. The ships are berthed on the East and Gulf Coasts
and maintained at reduced operational status. Once directed, the
ships can be brought to full operational status in four days. [Ref.
1:pg. 23]
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d. Other Bealift Aasets.
(1) U.S. Flag Merchant Fleet. Section 902 of the
Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended, subjects all U.S. flag
vessels to U.S. government requisition in times of mobilization.
Approximately 70% of the U.S. flag merchant fleet has been deemed
militarily useful. [Ref. 2:pg. 11)
Any U.S. flag vessel which has received federal
subsidies is a party to the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP). This
program also applies to operators carrying military cargo under MSC
contract. Upon mobilization, the SRP program allows these ships to
be available to MSC which administers the program. [Ref. 2:pg. 12]
(2) Effective U.S. Control Fleet. Effective U.S.
Control fleet (EUSC) vessels are U.S. owned, but registered under
foreign flags such as Panama or Liberia. The laws of the foreign
flags do not preclude or limit U.S. authority to recall these ships
in times of declared emergency under Section 902 of the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936. These ships are operated by foreign crews of
the ship' flag country. Questions have risen concerning the ability
to maintain the foreign crews in time of conflict or the ability of
the U.S. crew to operate unfamiliar ships. [Ref. 2:pg. 13)
(3) National Defense Reserve Fleet. The National
Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) consists of older merchant ships that
have some military utility. These ships are kept at three reserve
fleet sites within the United States in various states of
11




The Military Airlift Command, (MAC), grew from the post
World War II Military Air Transportation Service (MATS) established
in 1948. [Ref. 4:pg. 40] In 1977 MAC became a specified command.
[Ref. 5:pg. 352] Although the Army and Navy retain a small portion
of airlift capacity, MAC is the manager of all U.S. airlift
capability and has a substantial resource base. In 1987, MAC
consisted of more than 94,000 active duty military and civilian
personnel, 1000 aircraft, and over 340 locations in 26 countries.
[Ref. 4:pg. 42] MAC routinely supports the logistical needs of all
DOD services.
To complement the MAC's organic airlift capacity, the
Civil Reserve Air Fleet, (CRAF), was created in 1952. Under the
CRAF program, selected U.S. civil aircraft are contracted to
augment DOD assets in a state of emergency. [Ref. 4:pg. 44) In
1981 the Air Force submitted a Congressionally Mandated Mobility
Study (CMMS). In further defining the role of the Air Force the
mobility study recommended that MAC have an airlift level of 66
metric ton miles per day. [Ref. 5:pg. 373] In 1988, airlift
capacity was about 40 MTM/day. [Ref. 5:pg. 372] It is expected
that the recommended level of 66 MTM/day will be obtained in the
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late 1990's with the introduction of the C-17 aircraft. [Ref. 5:pg.
383] Modern airlift capacity has been designed around this lift
capacity and four lift scenarios: Persian Gulf, Soviet Invasion of
Iran, a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict, and a conflict in the Persian
Gulf Accompanied by a precautionary reinforcement of Europe. [Ref.
5:pg. 371]
b. Concept of Operatione
Airlift mobility forces provide a rapid deployment
capability of combat units to and within the war theater. Airlift
is designed to meet the critical 15 day deployment period
identified in the CMMS. [Ref. 5:pg. 368] it is predicted that more
than 90% of all materials arriving in the war theater within the
first 15-20 days of a conflict will be delivered by air. Long range
air operations is performed by C-141 and C-5 aircraft. The other
10% will be delivered by prepositioned ships. (Ref. 5:pg. 368]
After 20 days the percent of overall cargo to have reached the war
theater by sea will increase. [Ref. 5:pg. 369) Airlift will
provide almost all troop transport during a conflict. [Ref. 3]
Once the cargo reaches the war theater, inter-theater cargo
aircraft such as the C-130 will be used to transport it as
necessary within theater. CRAF aircraft are activated in three
stages with later stages having shorter response times and larger
call-ups. Activation of CRAF is done with full participation of the
Department of Transportation. The CRAF is expected to provide more
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than 11 metric ton miles per day during times of crises. [Ref.
5:pg. 382]
a. Airlift Assets
(1) Military Airlift Command. As mentioned previously,
the MAC relies on C-141 and C-5 aircraft for most heavy airlift
transport overseas. MAC uses C-9s and C-141s as primary troop
transporters. Once inside the war theater a large variety of
aircraft are used including the C-130, C-39, C-12, and C-140 fixed
wing aircraft along with various helicopters.
(2) Civil Reserve A-`r Fleet. Participation in the CRAF
consists of approximately 36 domestic air carriers flying a variety
of aircraft including the B-707, DC-8, B-747, DC-10, L-1011, B-767,
"snd the A-310. The CRAF consists of four segments: domestic,
Alaskan, short range international, and long range international.
[Ref. 4:pgs. 44,45] The long range international fleet augments
the MAC's long range C-141 and C-5 aircraft during periods of
conflict. [Ref. 5:pg. 382]
C. CONCLUSION
The mobility triad consists of airlift, sealift, and
prepositioned forces. The advantages to sealift are the large
tonnage capacity and the ability to select a variety of material
for each cargo depending upon priorities (flexibility). The
disadvantages of sealift are its slow speed and dependence on
seaports and sealanes. Two sealift forces, the Ready Reserve Force
14
(RRF) and the Maritime Prepositioned Ships (MPS) squadrons would
provide most of the material mobility in any conflict. This is
evidenced by the 1991 Persian Gulf Conflict.[Ref. 6:pg. 10] The
following chapter will develop a model for optimizing the
activation sealift ships in a time of crisis.
15
IIn. s8ALZrT OPTXIXZXNG MODEL
A. INTRODUCTXON/SCOPE
In this chapter an optimization model of sealift capability is
developed. The model is based on sealift ships making single trips
to the war zone and return to U.S. seaports (i.e. no return trips).
The chapter begins with a discussion of the objectives of sealift
and the factors that should be included in the model. Next,
alternative transportation modes are discussed and those beyond the
scope of the paper (not the model) are eliminated. The remaining
options form the basis of the paper.
Relevant costs are identified by examining the life cycle of a
typical sealift ship. Section E introduces the model. Included is
a discussion of possible, efficient, and optimal solutions to
sealift. Also included is a procedure for selecting an optimal
fleet. Section F presents the development of cost and time models
for the use in Section E. Next, procedures are defined that lead to
the optimization of each alternative. Finally, two examples are
included which demonstrate the calculation of the various indices.
B. OBJECTIVE
The objective of military mobility is to get as much of the
correct material to the war region as rapidly as possible.
Military policy dictates the size of U.S. forces and the equipment
1E
that each service will use. The military services then determine
the requirements for Navy sealift ships and Air Force airlift
aircraft. U.S. sealift and airlift planners base their analyses on
requirements dictated by military policy.
In order to determine the best mix of mobility, some measure of
effectiveness needs to be established. The effectiveness of sealift
ships and airlift aircraft can be measured by the amount of cargo
delivered to the war region in a certain period of time. To compare
the effectiveness of the different ships we derive an effectiveness
index that takes into consideration the amount of cargo that a ship
carries (capacity) and the time it takes to accomplish its mission
(speed). Once the effectiveness indices of individual mobility
elements are determined, these are combined with cost measures to
determine the optimal mix.
C. OPTIONS
In evaluating the alternatives for military mobility, many
options arise. This study is aimed at determining the optimal mix
of sealift ships. Airlift options are not considered for several
reasons. First, the missions of airlift and sealift are different.
As explained in Chapter II, airlift is used to deliver surge
equipment and troops. Although one role of sealift is to deliver
surge equipment through prepositioning, the primary role is to
deliver sustaining equipment. Moreover, the cost of purchasing a
fleet of aircraft that could deliver sufficient war materials for
17
a conflict is not economical. [Ref. 7:pg. 48] Sealift, therefore,
is intended to deliver 95% of dry cargo and 99% of liquid cargo
(petroleum, oil, lubricants, and water). This fact is underscored
by recent history in the war with Iraq. In that war, sealift had
carried as much to Saudi Arabia on the first two ships than the
total airlift deliveries to the theater, in what turned out to be
the biggest airlift in history. (Ref. 6:pg. 10]
The need for airlift is not disputed. Slower deployment rates
require substantially larger ground and air forces for the initial
stabilization and eventual counter-attack after the erupted
conflict. [Ref. 8:pg. 18) For example, quick delivery of critical
equipment may be essential in preventing an invader of a country
from securing ports and airstrips that the U.S. intends to use.
Without a policy of significant and early presence, the U.S. would
have to operate further from the war front and possibly encounter
greater layers of defense. Airlift, therefore, is essential in
providing materials for initial operations and insuring the U.S. a
supportable position. Differing requirements, though, demand that
airlift and sealift be analyzed separately.
Decreasing the existing force levels of the RRF and
prepositioned ships is not considered an option. The reason for
this is the growing realization that current U.S. military
objectives are unattainable without sufficient sealift capability.
[Ref. 31 This can be seen in the large increases in money spent on
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sealift during the last ten years. Even with the large increases,
Vice Admiral Francis R. Donovan Jr., Commander of Military Sealift
Command, has stated that the U.S. needs more ships. Specifically he
has stated that "RRF readiness must be improved" that "... there
aren't enough unit equipment-capable ships" and referring to the
Persian Gulf experience that "sustainment requirements would be met
with difficulty". [Ref. 9:pg. 12] The remaining options available
to the United States are essentially to accept the status quo or to
add to existing sealift capabilities. (Ref. 10:pg. 22] Thus the
options are:
1. Option 1: Status Quo - Optimal use of the existing
fleet.
2. Option 2: Fleet additions - Growth of the fleet




The Navy spent over $7 billion on military sealift from
1980 to 1990. (Ref. 9:pg. 12] The money spent, or the costs
associated with sealift, can be broken into several different
categories such as direct/indirect, fixed/variable, recurring/non-
recurring or total/marginal. All costs are or have been relevant to
some decision, past or future. The key is to distinguish the
relevant costs for present and future decisions from the irrelevant
costs. Relevant costs lie in the future, not in the past. [Ref.
ll:pg. 331
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In developing a model to determine the optimal least-cost fleet
of sealift ships, only those costs that lie in the future are
considered. For example, the acquisition costs of ships currently
in the RRF are sunk costs and therefore irrelevant to this study.
Alternatively, the yearly maintenance costs of the RRF represent an
example of relevant costs. However, the relevance of other cost
categories cannot be easily determined. An example of this is
indirect costs.
Indirect costs are those not easily associated with the
purchase, maintenance or operation of sealift ships. An example of
indirect costs is overhead such as support and maintenance
facilities. For example, the Department of Transportation, which
governs the Maritime Administration, employs thousands of civilian
personnel. Similarly, the Military Sealift Command employed
approximately 8000 civil service and military personnel in 1987.
[Ref. 4:pg. 17] Part of the necessity of each organization's large
staff is due to the indirect support of military sealift. Although
a part of these costs could be allocated to sealift, in practice
such allocation schemes are often arbitrary.
Other examples of indirect costs can be seen in the financial
statements of each organization. Overhead expenses of the Military
Sealift Command include the cost of computers and software, rent of
occupied buildings, maintenance and rental of office equipment,
stationary and postage. [Ref. 12:pg. 7]
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Because of the difficulty in allocating indirect costs, only
direct costs will be used to determine the effectiveness of sealift
ships. Indirect costs will not be closely examined in this study,
although future studies of military sealift should attempt to
include as many relevant indirect costs as possih- .
The major costs of sealift can be broken into three groups:
recurring costs, non-recurring costs, and contingency costs.
Recurring costs are those that occur on a continuing basis such as
maintenance. Non-recurring costs are those that only occur once in
the lifetime of the ship. The two major non-recurring costs are
acquisition and the initial deactivation. Contingency costs are the
cost of operating a sealift ship in a crisis. The four main
contingency costs are activation, manning, steaming (fulfillment of
operational requirements), and re-deactivation. The relevant need
to be measured are those that are additional (marginal) sealift
costs attributable to each mode of sealift. For instance, the
acquisition costs of the RRF should not be considered because they
have already been paid and therefore are sunk costs. The
acquisition costs of future sealift ships should, however, be
considered under Option 2.
2. Costs of Sealift Ships
To begin building a costing model for sealift ships, one
must determine the relevant costs of the ships. The costs of
concern are those that are directly affected by the purchase,
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repair or operation of the ships. Determination of the major costs
of sealift ships can be accomplished by using a life-cycle model.
This model includes 7 major steps. The steps begin with the
purchase or building of the ship for the purpose of sealift and
continue until the ship is scrapped or sold. The following is a
list of the seven major steps associated with the life-cycle of the
Ready Reserve Force and the MPS [Ref. 13, 14]:
Step 1: Ship Acquisition
Step 2: Deactivation and Storage
Step 3: Maintenance and Repair
Step 4: Activation
Step 5: Manning
Step 6: Fulfillment of Operational Requirements (when
necessary)
Step 7: Re-Deactivation and Storage
The major costs associated with each step are discussed below
for each of the alternatives.
a. Stop 1: Ship Acquisition
(1) Option 1. Ships in the first alternative have
already been purchased and therefore are a sunk cost. Past
acquisition costs of the current fleet are not relevant in this
analysis.
(2) Option 2. The cost of additional ships is a cost
that must be paid in the future and therefore is a relevant cost.
Ships for the RRF can be acquired from four basic sources: [Ref.
2:pg. 82]
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1. NDRF - Ships in the NDRF may be selected for upgrade to the
REF. This is an indirect purchasing method because the ships were
previously purchased by the U.S. for pY.acement in the NDRF. Thus
only costs associated with upgrading for sealift duty would be
relevant.
2. Transfers - Commercial type (former USNS) ships transferred
to the RRF by the Navy. The concept of opportunity costs would
require a calculation of forgone opportunities resulting from the
transfer.
3. Direct Purchase - Ships which are no longer commercially
competitive, but which have a high military value may be purchased
directly from U.S. and foreign owners. Di-ect purchasing began in
1984. In the past, older NDRF ships of little sealift value have
been traded (or scrapped for cash) for more valuable ships that are
placed into the RRF. The trade ratio in the past has been about two
older ships for one RRF capable ship. [Ref. 13]
4. New Purchase - Ships may be purchased new for the purpose
of sealift in the RRF. This is the l-ast preferred method due to
the high cost of new ships and the aspect of placing a ship in a
reduced operating status while the ship is new and useful.
Ships in the Maritime Prepositioning Force were
built or converted for the MPS program by three different
shipbuilders. [Ref. 15:pg. 1) Essentially, the same acquisition
options for the RRF hold true for the MPS ships. An additional cost
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of acquisition of MPS ships is the loading of its war stock. This
is because the war stock must be loaded prior to an MPS ship's
deactivation.
b. Stop 2: Deactivation and Storage
(1) Option 1. Ships that are in the RRF and
prepositioned forces have been deactivated and stored in
anticipation of a conflict. These costs are sunk costs to this
option and are therefore not relevant.
(2) Option 2. Once it has been decided that a ship is
to be placed into the PRF, it must be prepared for long term
storage. If the ship has been in the NDRF it must be reactivated to
bring the vessel up to a specified readiness status. NDRF
conversion ship work includes an operational test of the main
engines and major systems and dock trials. It also includes the
installation of any special equipment such as radio or
communication gear. [Ref. 13] Ships purchased directly or
transferred from sources other than the NDRF must also go through
a checking out process. Once the ship has been determined to be
operationally sound, its deactivation (or lay-up) begins.
The lay-up of an RRF ship includes putting each of
the ship's systems into a storage mode and placing the ship under
dehumidification and cathodic protection. [Ref. 2:pg. 45) Cathodic
protection is a method of electrically or chemically protecting the
hull of a ship from the corrosive effects of salt water.
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Dehumidification is the use of proper ventilation and the sealing
of spaces to lower the amount of harmful moisture inside of the
ship. The lay-up also includes ensuring that the propeller shaft is
locked and that the anchors are free for running in case of an
emergency.
Once the FP.F ship is laid-up it is towed to its
final storage area at one of the selected RRF ports along the East
and West coasts of the United States. The ships are then anchored
and nested with other RRF ships. [Ref. l:pg. 27]
MPS ships are deactivated to a lesser degree than
RRF ships. An indication of this is the fact that an RRF ship must
be towed to its deactivation site while an MPS ship will steam to
its site under its own power. One major difference is that the WPS
ship has all of its combat stock on board prior to deactivation.
Because of this, the MPS ship must periodically be activated to
sail. to a cargo maintenance facility.
c. Step 3: Maintenance and Repair
(1) Option 1. A ship that is being stored for possible
no-notice use must be maintained in a state of readiness. The
maintenance includes routine inspections and work on the
dehumidification and cathodic protection systems, inspections and
repair of machinery and engineering equipment, and periodic
painting. [Ref. 2:pg. 57] RRF ships are periodically reactivated
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with no notice to test the ability of the fleet to meet its five
day, 10 day, and 20 day activation status.
The activations also contribute to RRD readiness to
the extent that they identify and repair likely ship system
failures. RRF testing activations therefore, are partially
substitutable for the regular maintenance that occurs on the ships.
(Ref. 16:pg. 15] Six to seven ships a year are activated in no-
notice testing. [Ref. 13)
One significant cost of the maintenance of RRF
ships is inspections by the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS). ABS
establishes minimum material standards for safe operation of ships
that each ship must meet. The standards include specifications of
ship design such as hull thickness, insulation thickness on wires,
and alarms. Certification by the ABS implies that a ship has met
certain American standards of design and construction, but is not
a guarantee that the ship can be activated. [Ref. 16:pg. 10]
MPS ships are maintained by civilian personnel
under charter by the Military Sealift Command. Additionally, the
military cargo equipment on board is maintained by a separate
contractor. [Ref. 15:pg. 1] In this study the cost of maintenance
of the military cargo on board MPS ships is not considered for two
reasons. First, this study is aimed at providing a way to determine
the effectiveness of the ship as a means of delivering cargo.
Though the cost of maintaining and operating a ship will have an
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effect upon the performance of the ship, the maintenance of its
cargo will not. Second, any money spent on maintenance facilities
for MPS ahips is considered a sunk costs. If it is determined that
new facilities are needed to support MPS ships, then that cost
should be included in the analysis.
(2) Option 2. Since an additional ship purchased for
sealift must be maintained, the same costs as those described above
in Option 1 also pertain to Option 2.
d. Sten 4: Activation
(1) Option 1. To "Activate an RRF ship means to repair
it to operating condition and test it in sea trials". (Ref. 16:pg.
A-l] Upon the activation of specific operational orders and plans
the Military Sealift Command determines the need of RRF ships to
fulfill the logistic requirements of the plans and orders. [Ref.
2:pg. 86] If there is a need for RRF ships, MSC informs the CNO
Strategic Sealift Division (OP-42) of the requirement. The
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Shipbuilding and Logistics is
then contacted by OP-42 for approval and funding of shipyard work
and crewing of the required ships. The CNO will direct MSC to
activate certain ships. MSC will then inform MARAD of the exact
dates that the ships are needed. MARAD then directs the Ship
Manager to begin the activation process. Once the ship is activated
it is transferred to the operational control of MSC.
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Although an PRR ship may be stored at one port, it
may be taken to another port for reactivation work. This
arrangement is necessary because of the constraints placed upon the
storage port including a limitation of skilled workers and time for
activation. The following steps take place upon initiation of
activation of an RRF ship: [Ref. 17:pg. 5-2)
1. Breakout - This is the preparation of a designated ship for
movement to activation facilities. It may be necessary to move
entire nests of ships to retrieve the ship that has been
designated. This is not required for ships that are to be activated
at their storage port.
2. Tow - The towing of the designated ship from its storage
port to the activation facility.
3. Activation - Ships are activated according to activation
specifications. This includes bringing all specified systems and
engineering equipment on board the ship to operational standards.
Once activation work on a ship is considered completed, the ship
must conduct dock trials for proof of readiness. Dock trials
prepare the ship for sea trials and consists of testing the systems
and equipment on-board a ship while tied to-a pier.
4. Inspections - RRF ships must be inspected by the U.S. Coast
Guard and the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) for
certification of hull, major machinery, and designated systems.
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5. Sea Trial - Once an RRF ship's propulsion plant can
reliably hold steam, the underway testing of all of its shipboard
machinery is conducted. Sea trials usually last 24 hours or longer
and include the following: [Ref. 16:pg. A-3]
1. Steaming 16 hours at full power
2. Testing electronic communication and navigation
equipment.
3. Checking rudder response
4. Conducting emergency maneuvers (full ahead to full
astern and full astern to full ahead)
5. Testing cargo boom capacity
6. Delivery - Delivery is formally effected when MSC
accepts operational control of the vessel. MSC takes
control once it has been proved that the ship is ready
for sea.
The higher readiness of the MPS dictates that many
of the steps that occur for RRF ships are not required for MPS
ships. Steps 1-6 above do not take place on an MPS ship. Once an
MPS squadron is directed to activate, the crew on board the ships
in the squadron will prepare the ships for steaming to the war
port. The MPS ships set sail to the war port when the ship is
considered ready by the on board crew.
(2) Alternative 2. The activation of additional ships
in the RRF or MPS would essentially be similar to those already in
the fleet as described in Alternative 1.
e. Stop 5: Manning
(1) Alternative 1. Ships of the Ready Reserve will be
manned by merchant seamen. Billets needed to operate a sealift ship
are broken into six groups: licensed deck, engine, and radio and
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unlicensed deck, engine, and radio. Funding for the manning of RPF
ships must be approved by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Shipbuilding and Logistics. The process of manning RRF ships is
done concurrently with their activation. Once the ship is manned it
is ready for duty as assigned by MSC. (Ref. 2:pg. 60]
MPS ships are continually manned by a crew of
approximately 40 persons. [Ref. l:pg. 21] The cost of manning
ships in the MPS is considered as part of the maintenance cost of
the ships.
(2) Option 2. Fleet additions to the RRF and the
prepositioning forces would essentially be the same as that
described in Option 1.
f. Step 6: Fulfillment of Operational Requirements
(1) Option 1. The process of military mobility for the
RRF involves transporting goods from the continental United States
to anywhere in the world. This process can be broken down into a
set of steps or transportation linkages. [Ref. 18:pg. 83] The
linkages involved in the process start at the depot storage of
needed war-fighting materials and end at the deployment of the
materials for combat. The individual linkages are as follows:
START: DEPOT STORAGE
1. Stowage breakout and preparation for transportation
2. Loading of land transportation vehicles (truck or
train)
3. Marshal land vehicles for land transit
4. Land transit
5. Unload land transit vehicles
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6. Port material staging
7. Load Ships
8. Depart Port/Sea Transit
9. Unter War Theater Port
10. Unload Ships
11. Load forward theater transit vehicles
12. Land/Air transit
13. Unload land transit vehicles
14. Marshal equipment for combat deployment
FINISH: DEPLOYMENT TO COMBAT
From the above transportation links we can
eliminate links that do not effect the cost of providing sealift.
These are links that do not involve military sealift operations.
The links that can be eliminated in the transportation leg from
breakout to loading are items one through six. The linkages that
can be eliminated after the materials reach the war zone are items
eleven through fourteen.
As one can see, the linkages eliminated do not
contain the use of sealift ships and should not be considered in
the cost of sealift ships. In other words, the costs of the
linkages eliminated would occur no matter what type of sealift ship
is considered (assuming sealift is used in a conflict). The
transportation links that remain (steps 7 through 10) contain the
operational costs of providing or uperating sealift ships and
therefore should be considered further. Each of the steps involving
sealift is discussed below.
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(1) Operational linkage no. 7: Load Ships
Methods for loading the ships will. vary by ship type.. Roll-
on/Roll-off (RO/RO) ships have the advantage of being able to drive
the cargo into the holding cells. Other types of ships must have
their cargos loaded by crane and placed into position by forklift
or other means. Proper loading must take into consideration the
stability of the ship as a floating platform and the ships maximum
carrying capacity. Usually these are figured into the staging of
the materials prior to loading.
(2) Operational Linkage no. 8: Depart Port/Sea Transit
Once a ship is loaded it sets sail for the war region.
During wartime the ships will normally transit out to sea along
known routes that have been swept of potential mines (Q-Routes).
Once in the open ocean the ship may steam independently or within
a convoy. If the ship is to sail in a convoy it will normally
marshall with the other ships somewhere along its transit route.
(3) Operational linkage no. 9: Enter Port
After the sea transit, a sealift ship will normally transit
another Q-Route prior to entering the arrival port. If facilities
are not available or the piers at the arriving port are full, the
ship may be anchored outside the port.
(4) Operational linkage no. 10: Unload Ships
Ships that have arrived in the war region ports will be
unloaded upon arrival. Materials are taken off in the reverse order
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as they were loaded. Since there is no concern about efficient use
of space as in loading, this event takes considerably less time
than linkage no. 7 (loading). Ships that are anchored outside the
port may be unloaded by barge and/or helicopter.
The major difference in operating an MPS ship in
comparison to the RRF is that the MPS ship does not need to be
loaded after the beginning of a crises. As stated in Section B-i
above, loading costs are considered as part of the acquisition
costs of an MPS ship. The other operating costs (depart port/sea
transit, enter port, and unloading) are similar in nature to those
of RPY ships.
(2) Option 2. The operational requirements of
additional RRF and prepositioning ships would essentially be the
same as those already in the fleet.
g. Step 7: Deactivation and Storage
(1) Option 1. Sealift ships that have been activated
during a conflict must be preserved for the next conflict.
Depending upon the condition of ship after activation, the process
needed to deactivate a sealift ship after activation may be more or
less demanding than the initial deactivation (step 2). If the ship
has been used aggressively during the conflict it may need major
engineering or systems repairs. On the other hand, if the ship was
used only lightly, the task of deactivation and thus the cost of
the second deactivation should be less than the first.
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(2) Option 2. Deactivation and storage procedures for
additional RRF and prepositioning ships would essentially be the
same as for Option 1.
X. THE MODEL
The U.S. federal government has neither a price mechanism which
points the way to greater efficiency, nor competitive forces which
induce government units to carry out each function at minimum cost.
[Ref. 19:pg. 107] The desire of profits and the threat of
bankruptcy put pressure on private firms to seek out profitable
innovations and efficient methods. In the federal government, by
contrast, there is no profit incentive and rewards such as
promotions and salary increases do not depend on profits. Also, in
most federal government operations, an objective criterion of
efficiency is not readily available. (Ref. 19:pg. 108] In the
cases wnhere a criterion is available the incentives to seek
profitable innovations and efficient or least cost methods is not
very strong. For these reasons, systematic quantitative analysis in
military decisions is potentially much more important than in the
private sector.
The derivation of the model begins with a discussion of
optimal, efficient, and feasible solutions. Once these have been
discussed an effectiveness index is developed so sealift fleets of
differing ship types can be compared. Finally, a discussion of the
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optimization process is presented along with an example of
calculating the effectiveness indices of different ships.
1. Optimal, Efficient, and Feasible Solutions
In order to proceed with an economic analysis we must
define efficient, optimal, and feasible solutions. Efficient
solutions are those in which one output can not be increased
without sacrificing (decreasing) another. [Ref. 19:pg. 109] In
public economics, resource allocations that have the property that
an output choice can make no one better off without someone else
being made worse off are called Pareto-Efficient. [Ref. 20:pg. 63]
Although any technically efficient solution implies no waste of
resources, the value of the solution to decision makers may not be
maximized (optimal).
Feasible solutions are those obtainable with a given set of
inputs, but these may not all be technically efficient. Both
efficient and feasible solutions can be displayed using a
production possibilities curve. A production possibilities curve
traces the various amounts of two goods or outputs that can be
produced efficiently with a given technology and resources. [Ref.
20: pg. 10] Feasible solutions are bounded by the production
possibilities curve.
Two outputs (or characteristics) of sealift that can be
displayed on a production possibilities curve are capacity and
speed. For a set amount of resources (at a fixed technology level),
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sealift can provide different amounts of carrying capacity in
exchange for speed. When limited funding resources are directed at
providing more carrying capacity, then speed of delivery will be
sacrificed. If those resources are directed at providing more speed
then some carrying capacity is sacrificed.
The trade-off between speed and capacity is a continuing
debate among sealift policy makers. Fleet size is one of the
principal determinants of cargo lift capability and is limited
either by the amount of money available to Apend on sealift ships
or by existing capacity. Ship speed is also a principal determinant
and is limited to the technologies that government can afford. But
as speed increases, more of a given investment must be used to buy
increased horsepower, and correspondingly more demanding
engineering and production methodologies. Each dollar spent on more
horsepower and more demanding engineering and production
methodologies is a dollar not available on additional hulls. In
other words, fleet size, (i.e. capacity), becomes smaller as speed
increases. [Ref. 18:pg. 89)
In this paper the speed of a ship also takes into
consideration the speed of loading, unloading and the preparation
time for deploying the ship. Obviously, if more funding is expended
on maintaining a ship so that the ship can be deployed sooner,
fewer ships can be kept in the fleet for a fixed funding level.
Also, if improved loading and unloading features such as more
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cranes or built-in loading ramps are added, then fewer ships with
those features may be purchased.
Different ship types can therefore be described in terms of
two characteristics; speed and capacity. Illustrating alternative
ships in terms of speed and capacity, a "production possibilities
curve" can be plotted. As shown in Figure 3, different ships can be







Figure 3. Production Possibilities Curve
Figure 3 shows the relationship between speed and capacity
that can be purchased given a fixed amount of funding. Point C in
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Figure 3 indicates that with the use of a fleet of slow ships,
larger amounts of capacity may be purchased. Conversely, point B
suggests that by using faster ships, fewer may be purchased and
thus the total capacity is smaller. Any choice of speed and
capacity along the curve PP represents a technically efficient use
of the given resources and technology.
Fleet type A lies along the production possibilities curve
and therefore is an efficient choice. Fleet type B also lies along
the production possibilities curve, but is faster. For example,
ships in fleet type B may have larger and less fuel efficient
propulsion plants or better cranes to load and unload more quickly.
Because more funds were spent on the propulsion plant or better
cranes, less funds could be spent on total hulls. Therefore the
total capacity of fleetý type B is less than fleet type A.
Fleet type C is also on the production possibilities curve,
but is slower than fleet type A. For example, type C may have ships
with larger hulls or larger numbers of hulls, but more economical
propulsion plants or fewer loading devices than type A. Because
less money was spent on the propulsion plant or loading devices,
more money could be used to buy larger hulls or larger numbers of
hulls.
Choices inside of the curve are feasible choices, but are
not efficient. For instance, ships inside the production
possibilities curve may rely on older technologies. An example of
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a fleet inside PP may be steam powered ships purchased new (fleet
I). Steam ships are much more complex and demanding than diesel
powered ships and therefore would cost more in comparison for the
same capability. Alternatively, the capability (speed or capacity)
that could be purchased for a fixed amount of money is less than
for a more modern and more efficient ship. Choices outside the
curve are not currently feasible, although both more speed and more
capacity are always preferred to less of each.
Though technically efficient, most choices along the curve
may not be preferred or optimal. For instance, very large
capacities are worthless if goods cannot be delivered to the war
zone in reasonable time. Similarly, very fast ships are of no use
if their capacities are not sufficient to meet military logistical
requirements. In order to determine the outputs that produce the
most value to policy makers, we must develop criteria which can
lead to an optimal choice along the production possibilities curve.
An optimal solution is one which, given a set of resources,
produces an output with a maximum value in the face of known
constraints. [Ref. 19:pg. 109] If the solution is not optimal,
then one unit of a characteristic can be traded for another and the
total value of the output increases. The key to optimality is to
discover the value function of the decision maker(s).
The preferences of decision makers are required to
determine the optimal solution. A decision maker can be asked to
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evaluate the amount of one characteristic (speed) that he/she would
be willing to sacrifice for an additional unit (tons of capacity)
of another characteristic and remain equally satisfied. The result
of such a pair-wise comparison of characteristics is the set of
utility weights: U.... and Ua.p..jty (see Appendix A).
In this papex the pair-wise preferences of decision makers
is assumed linear between attribute levels (higher and lower levels
of speed and capacity). It is difficult enough to elicit pair-wise
preferences from decision makers without the additional (but more
realistic) assumption that these pair-wise preference relations
might change when evaluated at different attribute levels. The
linearity assumption is a local approximation of the "true"
(convex) relationship of a policy maker's pair-wise preferences.
The closer the alternatives are in terms of their characteristics,
the better this approximation will be. [Ref. 21: footnote 5)
Let U~v,,d be the weight or utility value that the decision
maker gives to the speed of a fleet of ships and U,.,it, be the
weight or utility value that the decision maker gives to the
capacity of a fleet of ships. The ratio U.•p.d/Ud.p.,±ty can then be
interpreted as the (constant) marginal rate of substitution (or
trade off) between speed and capacity. [Ref. 21:pg. 8]
Specifically, the ratio U.P../U,,P,,t represents how much speed a
decision maker is willing to sacrifice for an additional amount of
capacity. For instance, a ratio of 2/1 means that the decision
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maker is willing to give up two units of capacity to obtain one
unit of speed. The decision maker may have an even stronger
preference (say 4/1) for speed over capacity because of an urgent
need to get an initial amount of materials to the war zone to
counter the spread of an aggressor.
The essential implication is that this ratio defines a
decision maker's indifference curve. An indifference curve reveals
those combinations of characteristics which an individual finds
equally satisfactory. [Ref. 20:pg. 102] In other words, the
indifference curve illustrates various combinations of capacity and
speed which provide equal utility to the decision maker. A








Figure 4. Sealift Indifference Curves
The curve U in Figure 4a displays various combinations of
speed and capacity which the decision maker finds equally
satisfying, (the utility remains the same). Decision makers would
prefer curves outside of U, such as U1, to the curve U. More of
both characteristics is preferred to less. Alternatively, decision
makers would prefer the curve U to those curves inside of U such as
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U2 . The decision makers willingness to trade off speed for capacity
is revealed in the slope of the indifference curve.
Figure 4b displays an indifference curve in which the
decision maker prefers relatively more capacity and less speed than
a decision maker whose preferences are reflected in Figure 4a. In
this case the ratio of the utilities U,..d/Uapit, (or the marginal
rate of substitution) would be lower. In other words, in Fig. 4b
the decision maker is willing to sacrifice less capacity for
additional speed (say 2/1) than the decision maker in Fig. 4a (say
4/1). Note that the slope of a typical indifference curve in 4a may
change to that in 4b when "enough" speed is finally achieved, since
additional speed at the expense of a capacity is no longer as
desirable. A decision maker's indifference curves and the
production possibilities curve can now be integrated to determine
the optimal combination of output characteristics desired.
2. Uffectiveness Index
Determining the production possibility curve for sealift
ships with varying characteristics of speed and capacity is
relatively straight-forward given the ships available and market
prices. A more difficult task is determining the relevant utility
weights for speed and capacity.
Let, Up.,jty be the weight that policy makers give to the
characteristic capacity and let U,,..d be the weight policy makers
give to the characteristic speed (see Appendix A for one possible
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derivation of such weights). A policy maker's sealift utility
function will then be the sum of capacity and speed multiplied by
their respective weights or: U UoaP&Gity*C + U.P3 ,*S. The equation
can be rewritten as:
C = U/Uo.paoity - (Uoe/Uoopeoity) *S
where U.p.°d/UO°paOity is equal to the slope of the utility (or
indifference) curve. Note that the term U,,,,d/U,,P,,,ty is equal to the
marginal rate of substitution that a policy maker gives to capacity
and speed. The term UP°°d./Uca.paity is therefore the slope of the
indifference curve of capacity and speed. The problem now becomes
one of determining the relative weights Uo.0 P,,, and U.p.°d (see
Appendix A).
The weights, Uo.P,,it and U.p..d° can be used to determine the
Effectiveness Index for various fleets (or ship types). The index
is the sum of the weights multiplied by the respective ship
(normalized) characteristics, speed and capacity.
El = Up,,,t,* (Capacity) + Uap..d* (Speed)
Again, speed is a measure of the quickness of the ship to
meet its objectives and therefore is measured by the time that it
takes to perform its mission. To follow the "bigger is better"
maxim, it is necessary to subtract the actual time it takes a ship
to perform its mission from the maximum allowed to perform the
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mission (sealift delivery requirement). Ships that have actual
times that are greater than the requirement are not considered.
Therefore:
El = Up.6 ,ty* (Capacity) + Up* @ d(Timeeu -Timehotu.1)
The ratio of UU,/Uo..,.oLt is the marginal rate of
substitution and therefore is the slope of the indifference curve
of capacity and speed. The slope of the indifference (or utility)
curve then determines the -type of fleet(s) that is (are) most
preferred by decision makers. Figure 5a displays the optimal
decision given sealift fleets described by the production
possibilities curve in Figure 3, combined with the utility function
of decision makers. In Figure 5a, the most preferred type of fleet
consists of ships in fleet type A.
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Figure 5. Optimal Sealift Choices
The problem is that there may not be enough ships (i.e.
total capacity) in fleet type A to meet the requirements of sealift
designated by policy makers. Under the condition that no new ships
of type A can be acquired, the decision maker would choose along a
less preferred indifference curve such as IC' in Figure 5b. Lower
and lower indifference curves would be pursued until the required
capacity of sealift for the amount of money available is satisfied.
Note, that by moving the indifference curve inward, feasible and
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efficient ships are chosen, but not optimal ones, to fulfill the
sealift mission.
3. Optimization Process
The level of effectiveness can now be used to determine the
optimal fleet of sealift ships given existing ship types. The
derivation of the optimal fleet Js accomplished by continuing to
use the fleet (or group of ships with the same characteristics) of
one ship type as long as the ratio of the Effectiveness Index of
that fleet to the a second fleet (with a different characteristic
combination) is greater than the ratio of the costs of the fleets
or:
(El fleetl)/(EI fleet2) > (Cost fleetl/Cost fleet2)
By manipulating the above ratios we can choose the ship
with the higher ratios of Effectiveness to cost. For instance, in
comparing two fleets we would choose fleet 1, made of ships of type
1, if the following is true:
(EI fleetl)/(Cost fleetl) > (EI fleet2)/(Cost fleet2)
In this paper the term Quality Ratio will be used to
describe the ratio of the Effectiveness Index of a fleet of a
certain type of ships to the total cost of the fleet. Therefore,
the quality ratio of the nth fleet of ships (with a peculiar
47
combination of speed and capacity) in the total sealift fleet is
described as:
QRn - EIn/Cn
where Cn represents the total relevant cost of the nth fleet.
Ships of different types have characteristics that make
them more or less effective for a given cost or more or leas costly
for a ,tiven effectiveness. For instan~ce, steamiships that have been
deactivated for periods of time tend to be more expensive to
activate than diesel-driven ships. (Ref. 16:pg. 13] This is due to
several factors. First, the diesel ship is less complex and thus
takes less personnel and time to bring the ship to full activation.
Also, because of the steamship's complexity, it is more e:ýpensive
to test and thus is usually tested less often than diesel ships.
More problems, therefore, tend to arise during the activation of
steamships compounding its cost to deploy. (Ref. 16:pg. G-1]
Diesel ships would tend to have higher quality ratios than
steamships and would therefore be preferred.
Other charac-teristics such as the amount of maintenance
that a ship receives during layup and the age of a ship tend to
affect the cost of activation. [Ref. 16:pg. 13] Here, the more
maintenance a ship receives during layup the lower the costs of
activation.
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As mentioned above, some ship classes take more time to
perform loading and unloading tasks than others. Newer ships, such
as RO/ROs, allow loading by driving vehicles or equipment onto the
ships and thus are loaded quicker (i.e. time reduced from some
standard is greater) than other types. The decreased loading time
would thus tend to raise the effectiveness ratio for RO/RO fleets
relative to fleets with Eimilar ships and conventional loading.
Examples describing the derivation of the quality ratio for two
fleets consisting of different types of ships are given in the next
two sections. The first example demonstrates the determination of
the Quality Ratio for the existing fleet (Option 1). The secon•d
example demonstrates the determination of the Quality Ratio for
additions to the existing fleet (Option 2).
F. COST JAVD TIMEMODELS
In the sections below, models will be developed for the RRF and
the MPS. The cost model of the respective fleet types is first
determined. The delivery times of the respective fleets is then
determined. The cost and time models can then be used to compute
the Effectiveness Indices for the respective fleets.
The sealift costs used to develop the following cost models are
the relevant costs examined in Section D. The models depend upon
policy makers accountinq for the costs in the beparate accounts
given in that section (ie, ac~cr:sition, deactivation aad storage,
etc.). Once the costs outlined in Section D can ba determined, the
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policy maker can use the Quality Ratios to determine the most
effective fleet of ships to activate in a time of crisis given a
fixed budget. Therefore, by accounting for the costs of sealift
ships in a manner which allows the calculation of Quality Ratios,
significant future savings may be the result.
1. Option 1
a. RRF
The first step in developing an optimal mix for the RRF
is determining a measure oL.a effectiveness for the ships. Not all
ships can or should be compared. For instance, ships that carry
liquid cargos such as fuel or lubricants should not be compared
with ships that carry annmunition. This is because the measurement
of a certain amount of fuel carried on a tanker (tons) has little
correspondence to the ship carrying -immunition (ft2). Thcrefore
ships carrying fundamentally different products shoul.K- be c:'mpared
separately.
In this model, the effectiveness of cargo (dry) ships
is measured as the amount of area of cargo delivered in a period of
time: ft 2/Day. The Effectiveness Index should use ft2 as the units
of capacity. As mentioned above, area is preferred to weight since
it takes into consideration the ability to load awkward or bulky
cargo such as artillery. The effectiveness measurement of tankers
shall be the weight of liquid cargo delivered in a period of time
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or: Tons/Day. Therefore, the Effectiveness Index of tankers should
use the Capacity designated in tons.
(1) Costs: In the case of the RRF the relevant costs
are the maintenance costs and the contingent costs. The costs of
acquisition have been paid and therefore are considered sunk costs.
Each of the costs associated with the RRF is modeled below:
1. Maintenance costs: The maintenance costs of the RRF are the
stream of future costs for maintaining each ship. The cost of
maintenance for each year must be mnltiplied by a discount factor
to standardize the payments to the current year. A discount rate is
an interest rate used to convert future pnyments into present
values. [Ref. 22:pg. 736] The costs of maintenance for a ship
(ship number 1) can be represented by the term Clmit. This term
represents the sum of the stream of future payments for each year
that the. ship is hold in the RRF or:
Cl~imt = Sum[C1YX1 (fl) + Clyr2 (f 2) +. .. + Clym (f.)]
The term f. is the discount rate factor for the mth year in
the future that the RRF ship is maintained. Similarly, the cost of
maintenance for some second ship in the RBF may be represented by
C2,.it while the cost of the nth ship is Cn,.l.k
2. Activation Costs: The cost to activate a ship (ship number
one) is represented by the term C1.o•. The cost to activate the nth
ship can then be represented by the term Cn.0 t.
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3. Operational Costs: The operating costs of an RRF ship is
the cost of the ship to make a round trip to the war zone and back.
This cost is the sum of the ship's steaming costs and its loading
costs. Loading costs are a function of the time it takes to lad
the ship. Roll-on/roll-off ships take considerably less time to
load than break-bulk ships and therefore should be less costly to
load. Steaming costs are a function of the distance that the ship
must sail and the efficiency of the ship's engineering plant. Like
the maintenance and activation costs, the cost of steaming the
first ship is represented by CloP while the cost of the nth ship is
represented by CnP.
4. Manning Costs: The costs to man an RPF ship (ship numbec
1) in the time of crises is represented by CIln while the cost to
man the nth ship is Cn•,.
5. Re-Deactivation Costs: Once the ship has finished its duty
during the time of crises it must be deactivated. This deactivation
would be subsequent to the initial activation that places the ship
in the RRF. Like the other costs associated with the RP.F, the cost
of re-deactivating the first ship is repreriented by Cl,*, while
the cost to re-deactivate the nth ship is represented by Cnrd.t.
The total cost of the first ship can now be represented by
Clto•. This cost is the sum of the five costs discussed above or:
Ciot= ClM nait + Claot + ClP + Cl.an + Clrot. (1)
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(2) Time: The factor used in the denominator of the
performance ratio (PR) is time. The time used is that for which it
takes a ship in the R"F to deliver a shipload of materials from the
beginning of activation. The total time is therefore the time
needed to activate, man, load, transit to the war port, and unload.
The total time for the first ship is denoted as TI where:
Tltot = Tl.at + TI.,. + Tl1o.d + TI., + Tl,.ld (2)
The total time for the nth ship is denoted as Tn.
Note that the total time does not take into consideration the time
needed to steam from the war port back to the United States. Also,
if manning or loading take place concurrently with activation, then
the times would not be added outright. The time used would be the
time from the beginning of activation to the beginning of steaming.
The time of the return leg should not be considered
in the case of the initial load because the performance of the ship
is only based upon how fast the ship can get its load to the war.
If the ships are to be used in repeat trips to the war zone,
subsequent trips must include the return times of the ships.
The optimal ships may now be selected from the
ratio of PR to COST. The ships with the hi(her quality ratios
should be selected over those with lesser ratios. Therefore ships
with low quality ratios may be eliminated as long as the cumulative
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capacity does not become less than total cargo requirement of the
scenario.
b. MPS
The model for prepositioned ships may be determined
along the same lines as the model for the RRF. Again, the
measurement of effectiveness is determined first. Here we need to
reflect upon the characteristics of the prepositioned ships. MPS
ships carry a variety of cargo ranging from tanks and ammunition to
water, petrolcum and fuel. The measurement of effectiveness must be
able to take into consideration the variety of cargo. The measure
of effectiveness that is used for MPS ships is then the weight of
cargo delivered in a period of time: Tons/Day. Therefore, the units
of capacity used in the Effectiveness Index should be tons. By the
nature of prepositioning, the time needed to reach the war zone is
reduced. Each of the costs associated with prepositioning is
modeled in the same manner as RRF ships.
(2) Costs:
1. Maintenance costs: The cost of manning is included in the
maintenance of the ships. Therefore, the cost of maintenance is
higher than it would normally be if the ships were not continually
manned. The maintenance costs of a prepositioned ship may also
include costs not associated with other forms of sealift such as
the costs to rent an anchorage site. As in the model for the RRF,
the maintenance costs are a stream of future costs for maintaining
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each ship. The term representing the maintenance cost of the nth
ship is again represented as:
Cr,,,,t - Sum[Cn. 1 (f,) + Cnr 2 (f 2 ) +...+ Cnpj(fm)]
Again, the term f, is the discount rate factor for the mth
year in the future that the prepositioned ship is maintained.
2. Activation Costs: As in the case of the RRF, the term
Cn..t is used to represent the cost to activate the nth ship in the
prepositioned fleet.
3. Operating Costs: Because the ships in the prepositioned
force are loaded prior to a crises, their loading costs are
therefore sunk costs. The primary operational cost associated with
the prepositioned force is the steaming cost. Steaming costs should
include the cost of the prepositioned ship to make a round trip.
Prepositioned ships may be used in repetitive trips in a time of
crises. Therefore in such situations the steaming costs must also
include the costs to sail from the war zone to the United States
after the initial unloading. As in the model of the RRF, the cost
to operate the nth ship in the prepositioned force will be
represented as Cn0 P.
4. Re-Deactivation Costs: The re-deactivation of the
prepositioned ships is more involved than that of the RRF because
it includes the cost of loading the ship with war stock. The cost
of loading would include the cost of steaming to the nrepositioned
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anchorage after loading. Again the re-deactivation costs for the
nth ship are modeled as Cnflt.
The total cost of the of the nth ship to perform its
mission is represented by:
Cntot =, Cn ,,•t + Cn.o.t + CnP + Cn. o• (3)
(2) Time: The time us-d ilL the Effectiveness Index is
the time a prepositioned ship takes to deliver its materials. The
total time is therefore the time to activate, transit to the war
port, and unload. The total time for the nth ship is denoted as
Tntot where:
Tntot - Tn..t + Tn.. + Tnuloa.. (4)
If the ship is to make only one trip, the time of
the return trip should not be considered. This is because the
return time is not considered as a measure of the effectiveness of
the ship. If the ship is directed to make numerous trips after its
first unloading, than the time that the ship takes to reach a port
to be reloaded should be part of the analysis.
Like the case of the RRF model, the optimal mix of
MPS ships is the one with the highest quality ratios. Ships with
the lowest quality ratios may be eliminated unless the cumulative
cargo capacity is reduced below the scenario capacity requirements.
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2. Option 2
As in Option 1, the measure of effectiveness should
coincide with the type of ship and fleet for which the ship is
being acquired. For instance, if the ship is a cargo ship (dry) to
be used in the RRF than the measure of effectiveness should be
ft 2/Day (the same as for Option 1). Units of ft 2 should be used in
the Effectiveness Index. Similarly, ships acquired for use in the
MPS should use tons per day as the measurement of effectiveness.
The unit of Tons are therefore the units of MPS capacity.
For the option of acquiring new ships for the RRF and
prepositioned forces the full life-cycle costs must be considered.
Acquisition costs along with deactivation and storage costs are no
longer sunk costs as they were in Alternative 1. Each of the costs
associated with addition of a ship to the sealift fleet is modeled
below.
a. Costs
1. Acquisition cost: Acquisition costs are the total costs
spent to place a new ship into either the RRF or the MPS. If
payment for the ships is to take place over a period of time than
the value of the payment is the net present value for the year of
placement into the fleet. The terms for the nth ship is modeled as
Cnpurah, where Cnp,,,h is the total payment for a lump-sum payment ship
and is equal to the net present value for ships when there are
payments over time.
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2. Deactivation and Storage cost: Any ship acquired for the
purpose of sealift will be deactivated and placed into storage.
The level of deactivation will depend upon the fleet in which the
ship is placed. As discussed earlier, prepositioned ships are kept
at a higher readiness level than RRF ships and therefore will have
smaller deactivation and storage costs. The deactivation and
storage costs for the nth ship are modeled by the term Cnst. It
should be noted that the cost of acquiring an MPS ship would also
include the loading cost for its load of materials.
3. As in Option 1, the maintenance costs of additional ships
will be the stream of future costs for the maintenance. Again, the
maintenance costs for the nth ship can be represented as Cn.,,,. As
noted for Option 1, the cost of maintaining prepositioned ships
also includes the manning costs.
4. Activation Costs: The costs to activate an additional ship
is essentially includes the same costs as for Option 1 and is
represented by the term Cn 5 .t.
5. Operational Costs: As for Option 1, the costs for the
operation of an additional (nth) sealift ship are represented by
the term CnP.
6. Manning Costs: Marginal manning costs only occur in a time
of crises for the RRF. As in Alternative 1, manning costs for
prepositioned forces are included in the cost of maintaining those
ships. The cost of manning in the case of a ship added to the R"
is modeled by the term Cn.,.
7. Re-Deactivation Costs: Re-Deactivation costs for ships
added to the RRF or MPS squadrons are modeled by the term Cnf.,,t.
The total cost for the addition of a ship to the MIF or
the MPS would be the sum of each of the marginal costs of the ship.
For the nth ship that cost would bei
RRF: Cntt = Cnpur + CnDt + Cn.•t + Cn,,, +Cn•. + Cn0O + Cnr.d.• (5)
MPS: Cntot = Cnpla + CnDst + Cn~it + Cn.Ot + Cnp + Cn..u. (6)
b. Time
The factor, time, is the same used in the Effectiveness
Index for Option 1. The time measurements for additions to the RRF
and MPS squadrons would be:
REP: Tnt,0 - Tn 0 , + Tn 8 . + Tnflod + Tn., + Tnl..ad (7)
MPS: Tnt~t Tflaot + Tn 1t, + Tnul..d (8)
Each element of time is the same as described in Option
1.
G. OPTIMIZATION PROCEDURES
Once the measure of effectiveness, the Effectiveness Index, and
the cost of a ship in a certain fleet has been determined, then the
fleet may be optimized. The optimization procedures will be




The total cost and the Effectiveness Index of each RRF
ship may now be used to determine the optimal mix of existing ships
to activate. For N ships in the RRF a table of the costs and
performance can be produced as shown in Figure 6. In Figure 6,
cumCAP is the cumulative capacity of the ships as each ship is
added to the analysis. Both Capacity and the cumulative capacity
are shown in ft 2 for the measurement of cargo capacity and
cumulative cargo capacity respectively. The unit cumCost is the
cumulative cost of all ships selected to be in the fleet. The
analysis table for tankers would be the same except that the
measurement of capacity and cumulative capacity would be given in
tons.
SHIP COST cumCOST CAPACITY cumCAP SPD TIME El QR
($) ($) (ft 2 ) (ft 2) (kts) (days) (El/Cn)
S1 Clio• Cltot CAPI CAPI SPi T1 Eli QRI
S2 C2t0 t Cltot+ CAP2 CAP1+ SP2 T2 E12 QR2
C2tot CAP2
Sn Cntot SUM[C1- CAPn SMU4 SPn Tn EIn QRn
Cn] [CAPl-
CAPn]
Figure 6. Analysis Table.
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Ships with higher quality ratios should be selected
over ships with lower quality ratios. Therefore, select ships for
the PRF by choosing the ship with the highest quality ratio first
until these are used up and then selecting ships with decreasing
quality ratios. The last ship selected would be the additional ship
that provides a total cumulative capacity that just meets that
required by the sealift scenario or whose cost added to the
cumulative costs just exhausts the budget.
b. MrS
Prepositioned fleet ships may be least-cost optimized
using the same procedures as for the RRF ships. As discussed above,
the effectiveness of prepositioned ships should be measured in
tons. In this case, the capacity measurement in Figure 6 would be
measured in tons instead of ft 2 .
c. RRF vs. MPS
Ia Sections la and lb, the optimal selecticn of ships
within a fleet (RRF or MPS) was determined. The two fleets may be
optimized together. In this case, the costs and time factors that
are relevant to the ships within the respective fleets should be
used. Fcr instance, equations (1) and (2) should be used for ships
within the RRF fleet while equations (3) and (4) should be used for
ships within the MPS squadrons. The units of cargo capacity must
allow comparison between the fleets. Since MPS ships must use tons
to measure their liquid carrying capzcity, tons should be used as
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the units of cargo capacity when comparing effectiveness between
fleets.
The requirement (scenario) for getting a certain amount
of materials to the war zone in a certain period of time is the
same for both fleets. Again, ships with the highest quality ratios
would be selected first until those are used up, and then select
ships with decreasing quality ratios. The last ship selected would
be the additional ship that provides a total cumulative capacity
that just meets that required by the sealift requirement or whose
cost added to the cumulative costs just exhausts the budget.
2. Option 2
Option 2 involves choosing ships to acquire for the RRF or
the prepositioned forces. It is straight-forward when a ship must
be added to one o= the other fleets. A more complicated decision
occurs when a ship can be placed in either of the fleets.
In this case, the Effectiveness Index of the ship must be
estimated for both fleets. For instancr,, to calculate the
performance ratio of the ship for the RRF the ship's carrying
capacity should be used along with -4quations (5) and (7). In
determining the performance ratio for the ship in the prepositioned
force, the ship' s carrying capacity would be used again, but now
with equations (6) and (8). A comparison of the performance ratio
for each fleet can now be made. Additional ships should be acquired
and placed into the fleet which give the largest performance ratio.
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H. ZXAMPLE 1. (OPTIMIZATXON OF CURRNT FLEET)
In this section an example of how to determine the Quality
Ratios of different fleets (type of ships) is presented. The
example uses two hypothetical ships with differing characteristics.
Note that ship speed is only part of the total measure of
performance or quickness of the ship types. The measure of
performance of speed is the amount of time less than the maximum
allowable time set by policy makers (50 days in this example).
Other factors include the activation, loading, unloading times.
Fast Shig Fleet Slow Ship Fleet
Ship Speed: 25 kts 18 kts
Time to Per-
form Mi3sion: 30 days 40 days
Speed: 20 days 10 days
(measure of
performance)
Cargo Capacity: 12,000 ft2  15,000 ft
2
Fleet Size: 5 ships 8 ships
Total Capacity: 60,000 ft 2  120,000 ft 2
Relevant Costs
1l.Acquisition




& Deactivation: $35 Million/ship $30 Million/ship
MINIMUM STANDARD
REQUIREMENT: 50 days
Option 1 Budget: $250 Million
Option 2 Budget: $400 Million
The budget for the existing ships is the cost of each ship
for an expected contingency. This budget would include,
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maintenance, a',tivation, manning, operating, and deactivation
costs. The new ship budget would include acquisition, storage,
maintenance, activation, manning, operating, and deactivation
costs.
1, Determination of Production Possibilities Curve
The production possibilities curve of the two fleets of









-- _ _SPEED (days)
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Figure 7. Existing Fleet Production Possibilities
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PP is the production possibilities for a single ship in
the existing fleet while PP' is the production possibilities of the
entire existing fleet.
2. Determination of Indifference Curves
After surveying decision makers suppose it is found
that the decision maker places tha same value of an additional
10,000 ft 2 of war materials reaching the war zone as equal to the
value of the materials reaching the war zone two days sooner. In
other words 10,000 ft 2 -- two days sooner delivery or one day is
valued 5000 times more than 1 ft 2. Said another way, the policy
maker would be willing to give up 1/5000 of a day for an additional
ft 2 of capacity. The utility weights U.,pi• and Ulp.,d may be
determined as they are in Appendix A. A table similar to Table Al
may be set up to display these calculations.
I CAPACITY I SPEED I Weights
CAPACITY (ft 2 ) I 1 I 1/5000 I = .0002/1.0002
I I =.0002 1 = .00019996
SPEED (days) 1 5000 I 1 I U,pd = 1/1.0002 = .99980004
SuM I 1.0002 1
The weights make up the slope of the indifference curve
or
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3. Determination of the Quality Ratios
The weights can now be used to determine the Effectiveness Index.
The characteristics of each ship is considered representative of
its fleet and is used in the calculation.
Fast Ship Fleet:
ul - (.00019996)*12kft 2 + (.99980004)*(20)days
- 2.395 + 19.999
= 22.399
Slow Ship Fleet:
EI - (.00019996)*15kft 2 + (.99980004)*(10)days
2.999 + 9.998
- 12.997
The Effectiveness Index can now be used to determine
the Quality Ratio. In Section 3 the Quality Ratio for a ship was
defined as the Effectiveness Index divided by the total relevant
cost of the ship or: QR - EI/C. For the Fast Ship Fleet, the
Quality Ratio would be:
QR,. 22.399/(35,000,000)
= 6.399x10-7





Note that the cost used to determine the Quality Ratios
is the costs considered relevant to the fleets. Acquisition costs
were not included in the analysis. The results of the analysis is
that the fast ships are the most effective to activate in a time of
crisis given policy makers' preferc:ncep.
The ships are activated with-in the constraint cf a
$250 million budget. The cost of activating all fivw of the fast
ships is $35M times 5 or $175M. Therefore, $75M remains unspent.
Two additional ships of the slow class may be purchased. The total
amount of capacity activated is (12,000 ft 2 * 5) + (15,000 ft 2 * 2)
= 90,000 ft 2 . The total cost of activation is ($35M * 5) + ($30M *
2) = $235 million. The speed and capacity of the combination of
ships is optimal given the preferences of the decision maker.
I. EXAMPLE 2. (OPTIMAL CHOICE FOR FLEET ADDITION$)
1. Determination of Production Possibilities Curve
The production possibilities curve of fleet additions
is determined from the data given in Example 1. In this example the
relevant cost for one ship of the Fast I'leot is $133 Million and
for the Slow Fleet it is $80 Million. The total budget that can be
spent on the new sealift ships ($400M) can therefore purchase and
support three ships of the Fast Ship type or five ships of the Slow
Ship type. Figure 8 shows the production possibility for the new
purchase.
67







5 10 15 20 25
Figure 8. Additional Ship Production Possibility
Again, the single ship production possibilities is
designated by PP while the production possibilities for the entire
fleet that can be purchased is designated by PP'.
2. Determination of Indifference Curve
The Indifference curves of the additional ships can are
the same as those for Example 1.
3. Determination of Quality Ratios




EX = (.00019996)*(12,000*. ft 2 ) + (.99980004)*20days
- 7.199 + 19.996
- 27.195
Slow Ship Fleet
91 - (.00019996)*(15,000*5 ft 2 ) + (.99980004)*10days
- 14.997 + 9.9980004
= 24.995
The Quality Ratios of the different fleet additions are
now computed:
QRr., -= 27.195/400M = 6.799xi0-8
QRSoW = 24.995/400M = 6.24 9 xl0-B
The Fast Ship additions is therefore the most effective
choice of policy makers given a limited budget of $400 million.
J. CONCLUSION
A model for optimizing sealift fleets has been developed.
First, options were specified for subsequent optimization. Once
the options were specified, costs of the options were discussed.
The relevant costs were then determined by examining the life-cycle
of sealift ships. Once the relevant costs were determined an
optimization model was developed that considered the choices of
decision makers. Cost and time models were then determined for use
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in the optimization model. Finally, procedures were given for
optimizing the options selected at the beginning.
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IV. MULTIPLE TRIP MODEL
A. INTRODUCTION
Optimization models for single trip mobilizations were
developed in Chapter III. The models in Chapter III were developed
for sealift ships that mobilized and performed a one trip mission.
It was assumed that once the ship delivered its goods that its
mission was complete. If sealift ships are intended to make
multiple trips (i.e. deliver, return, reload, deliver, etc.), then
the additional trips should be considered in determining the
effectiveness of the ships. This chapter will extend the cost and
time concepts developed in Chapter III to derive models for
multiple trips. As in Chapter III, the models are developed for two
options: 1. the status quo and 2. fleet additions.
B. COST AND TIME MODELS
1. Option 1
a. RRF
(1) Costs. A cost model for multiple trip
mobilizations in the RRF can be developed along the same lines as
in Section G of Chapter III. As in Chapter III, the measurement of
dry cargo capacity should be in units of ft2 and tanker capacity is
measured in the units of tons.
1. Maintenance Costs: Similar to the single trip model, the
maintenance costs of the RRF are a stream of future costs for
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maintaining each ship. The cost of maintenance for each year must
be multiplied by a discount rate to standardize the payments to the
current year. The maintenance cost of the nth Option 1 RRF ship is
modeled by Cnii,t where:
Cni~t = Sum[Cn, 1 (f 1 ) + Cnyr2 (f 2 ) +...+ Cnflyr(f.)
and the term f, is the discount rate factor for the meh year in the
future that the RRF ship is maintained.
2. Activation Costs: Similar to the single trip model, the
cost of activating the nth RRF ship is modeled by the term Cn.,,.
3. Operational Costs: The operating costs of the multiple
trip model are the most changed in comparison to the single trip
model. The operation of the ship is now more extensive. Again, the
operating costs take into consideration the loading, steaming, and
unloading of the ship. Here, though, the ship may be loaded,
sailed, and unloaded two or more times. The total cost of the nth
ship for the multiple trips and the subsequent loading and
unloading is modeled by the term Sum[CnR],) .
4. Manning Costs: The costs to man the nth ship is modeled as
Cnf..
5. Redactivation: Once the ship has completed its mission it
must be deactivated and prepared for the next contingency. This
deactivation is subsequent to the original deactivation that placed
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the ship into the MRF. Again, the deactivation costs for the nth
ship are modeled by the term Cn,.,t.
The total costs associated with a multiple trip for
the nth ship in the RRF can now be modeled as:
Cntot = Cni.t + Cn.,t + Sum[Cn,,] + Cn.,, + Cn.ot.
(2) Time. The time that a multiple trip RRF ship takes
to perform its mission is significantly changed from the single
trip model. Here the time of subsequent trips must be considered.
As in the single trip model, the time of the final return trip
should not be considered because ship has completed its mission
once it unloads the last time. The total multiple trip time for the
nth ship can be modeled as:
Tntot = Tn.0 t + Tn.. + 8um[T,,,,] - Tn r..Ur.
where Tn~at, Tnr., Tnrutur. is the time to activate, man, and return
the ship after the final unloading respectively. The term Sum[T,0 P]
is the round trip operating times consisting of the sums of the
round trip loading, steaming, and unloading times.
Sum[TnR0 P] = Sum[Tn,,,a] + Sum[Tn.,] + Sum[Tnunlo.d]
b. teS
The model for prepositioned ships may be determined
along the same lines as the RRF model. Because prepositioned ships
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carry a variety of liquid and dry cargo, the effectiveness of the
ships is measured by tons per day delivered. The unit of capacity
used in the Effectiveness Index is therefore tons.
(1) Costs
1. Maintenance Costs: As in the single trip model, the cost
of manning is included in the maintenance because of its peace-time
manning. The maintenance costs would also include rental fees for
anchorage sites. The maintenance costs of the n h ship are modeled
by the term Cnu.,t where:
Cn.., = Sum [[Cnyri(fi) + Cny.2 (f 2 ) + .. + Cn,, (f.)].
Again the term f. is the discount rate factor for the mth year in
the future that the prepositioned ship is maintained.
2. Activation Costs: As in the case with the RRF, the term
Cn,,t is used to represent the cost to activated the nth ship in the
prepositioned force.
3. Operating Costs: The cost of operating is the most changed
in the multiple trip model compared to the single trip model. Here
the cost of the first leg is to the war zone. Once the ship has
unloaded in the war zone, it must travel to the continental United
States for further loading. The total operating costs also include
the final loading and return to the original anchorage site. The
round trip operating costs are modeled by the term Cn3 Top.
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4. Deactivation Costs: Once the ship has returned to its
original anchorage site it will be deactivated. Although
deactivated, the ship remains manned and in a much higher readiness
level than RRF ships. The deactivation costs for the nth ship are
modeled by the term Cnd,,t. The total cost for the nth ship is then
modeled as:
Cntot = Cnla&.t + Cn,,t + CnRTOP + Cndt.
(2) Time. The time relevant to a prepositioned ship is
the time from being called into service to the tinme after its last
unloading. The time that the ship takes to make the original trip
to the war zone and unload is modeled by the terms T.t and Tunlo.d
respectfully.
The time for the total of each subsequent round trip is modeled
by the term Sum[TRTp] where:
Sum[TToP] = Tn.0 t + Sum[TRT.t] + Sum(TRTIO.d] + Sum[TRT,,u.Id].
Here Sum(TRT.1], Sum[kTl,,d], and Sum[TR•U.lo.d] are the total
steaming, loading, and unloading times respectively, in trips
subsequent to the first to the war zone.
2. Option 2
As in Option 1, the measure of effectiveness should
coincide with the type of ship and fleet for which the ship is
being acquired. Ships types with dry cargo will use the measure of
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effectiveness of ft 2 /Day, thus their unit of capacity used in the
Effectiveness Index is ft 2 . For ship types that carry liquid
cargos, the unit of capacity is tons.
a. RRN
(1) Costs. The cost of fleet additions is similar to
the cost for Option 1 with the addition of the purchase costs and
the original deactivation costs which place the ship in the RRF. As
in Chapter III, the purchase costs and the original deactivation
and storage costs for the nfth ship are modeled by the terms Cnpurch
and CnD,, respectively. The total costs of an additional ship in the
RRF is modeled by:
Cntot = CnPU, + CnDSt + Cnint + Cnaot + Cnr. + Sum[Cnlop] + Cnr.da
where Cn.ot, Cnj.t, Cn.., Sum[CnotP] , and Cnr.4 0 is the sarre as
defined in Alternative 1.
(2) Time. The time that a fleet addition takes to
perform its mission is the same as those ships already in the
fleet. The total time to perform the mission is modeled by the
term&-:
Ttot = Ts t + T... + Sum[TRTop] - Tr.t
The terms are exactly the same as those defined in Option 1.
b. MYS
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(1) Costs. Fleet additions to prepositioned forces must
include the purchase and original deactivation and storage of the
ship at its prepositioned site. The costs are modeled in the exact
•aante way as in Alternative 1. The total costs with the purchase and
deactivation and storage terms is modeled as:
Cntot - Cnp..h + CnDft + CnAint + Cnot + CnR•,p + Cn,.o,
(2) Time. The time that should be used in the
Effectiveness Index is exactly the same as that for Option 1.
C. CONCLUSION
The method for the optimal use of the fleets will be the same
as that given in Chapter III. The model in this chapter may be used
if multiple trips by sealift ships are expected. If only one trip




The research in this paper has produced three significant
points. The first is that decision makers should include their
preferences of capacity and speed in decisions about aealift fleet
components. Another result is that significant benefits may be
achieved by making changes in the accounting practices for sealift
expenditures. Also, the optimal fleet may be a combination of ships
with various mixes of the characteristics of speed and capacity.
Each of the results is discussed below.
The preferences of speed and capacity is a significant alement
in the determination ow an optimal mix of sealift ships. Without
knowing what trade-offs the decision maker would be willing to
make, a choice of a fleet of ships would tend to fulfill either,
but not optimally. By deciding upon a fleet of ships that either
fulfills a capacity requirement or a speed/time requirement,
significant preferred capability is being ignored and wasted.
Significant savings seem to be achievable by changes in the
accounting practices of the Maritime Administration and the
Strategic Sealift Command. The current practice of grouping
expenditures into appropriation accounts and major ship types is
too broad for their use in an optimization model of the sealift
fleet. Collection of RJPr maintenance/equipment replacement
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expenditures by individual hull/ship would increase the ability to
assess the value of the sealift fleet. Decisions based on "expected
effectiveness" (Chapter III, E.3) and future R" acquisitions could
be accomplished with greater knowledge of the individual ship's
contribution to naval sealift. This appears to be a minor change to
the MaritimeAdministration accounting system since the maintenance
work is accomplished by ship hull.
The model also points out that an optimal mix of sealift ships
may consist of a cunrination of ships with various mixes of the
characteristics of speed and capacity. The decision maker should
first select those ships that lie on the indifference curve and the
production possibilities curve. If the number of ships at this
"most. preferred point" is insufficient, then the decision maker
moves to a lower indifference curve.
It may be that the next available type of ship along the
production possibilities curve is high in capacity and low in
speed. If after selection of this second type the requirements are
still not satisfied, then the decision maker moves to an even lower
indifference curve. The lower indifference curve may include ships
that have the characteristics of high speed and low capacity.
The point is that given the trade-offs that a decision maker is
willing to make regarding sealift ship types, a combination of
different ships may fulfill his requirements and his preferences.
The goal is to obtain and activate those ships that provide the
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beat efficiency while considering the preferences of the decision
maker (slope of the indifference curve).
B. RZCOMMENDATIONS
When comparing fleet types using the Quality Ratio it should be
noted that the comparison is between ratios. Ratios may be
misleading especially if there are bands of uncertainty around
capabilities or costs.
Similarly, since the determination of a best mix is
accomplished with numbers, there is an opportunity to change the
numbers after the fact. For example, should a ship selection be
unsatisfactory (based on the quality ratios), the assumptions and
considerations of decision maker preferences may be easily changed
to provide a more desired result. It is important not to deviate
from the original preference data in order to insure consistent
results.
Also, the Quality Ratio should only be used as a tool for the
selection of sealift fleets. Other considerations not included in
the analysis may be sufficient to over-ride the selection
calculated with the Quality Ratios. Other considerations not
included in the analysis may be the ship construction industry, the
size and category of indirect costs, the availability of qualified
personnel to operate sealift ships, and the availability of
adequate storage and activation facilities for the RRF.
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C. FUTURE RZESEARCH EFFORTS
Research efforts should be taken to prove the models provided
in Chapters III and IV. Considerable data is available at the
Military Sealift Command and the Maritime Administration that may
be collected and used in an analysis. Also, a study of the indirect
costs of military sealift should be done in order to verify the
assumption that they do not significantly affect the results of the
analysis.
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APIPZNDXX A. CALCULILTION OF RLhATIV WEZIGETS
One way to determine U.,Pikit, and Ud is to elicit the values of
speed and sealift from policy makers. Questions may be asked of the
relative importance of an amount of capacity compared to an amount
of speed. Note that here the term "speed" is the relative quickness
of a sealift mode. It is not measured in the parochial units of
distance/time, but is a measurement of time alone. A measure of
speed is therefore the amount of time that it takes a ship to
perform its task. The measurement of time from some standard is
used. Therefore ships quicker than the standard would increase
their Effectiveness Index while ships that are slower than the
standard would decrease their Effectiveness Index.
Let Cc be a relative amount of speed that a policy maker would
be willing to trade for given amount of capacity. The following
procedure can be used. The relative weights a and b can be
calculated by dividing the second column of values by the sum of
the values. [Ref. 21:pg. 8] Table 1 displays the steps that are
performed to obtain the weighted values.
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CAPACITY i SPEED weights
-- where
CAPACITY I 1 I Cc I U0nity W- Cc/Sum I Sum + Cc
SPEED I I/Cc I 1 i U.P-d i1/Sum I
I Sum I
Table Al. Calculating Weights
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